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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Migrants from Central America have moved in
large numbers in recent years. According to
the most recent Global Trends Report of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), the total number of asylum seekers,
refugees, internally displaced persons, and
returnees from Central America was 107,407 in
2014, while a total of 905,796 were registered by
2019. The arrival of so many internally displaced
populations (IDPs), migrants, and refugees
has created challenges and opportunities
for countries in the region within a few years.
Natural disasters and the COVID-19 pandemic
have only added complexity to the situation.
As it has become clear that many displaced migrants will remain abroad for an extended period, if not permanently, the focus has begun
to shift from the provision of humanitarian aid
to understanding the root causes of migration
to strengthen the countries of origin preparedness, infrastructure, access to services, and
institutional reforms to address the situation.
Such measures hold the potential to benefit
the displaced populations, migrants and refugees, and the communities in which they live
by boosting economic development and social equity and reinforcing social cohesion.

To examine the link between climate change
and human mobility of migrants and refugees
in this region, this report analyzes data from
the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
(IDMC), United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) studies, and various data from
other sources, reports, and additional research
resources. The report explores the correlation
between three key dimensions that could trigger factors for human mobility northward—
natural disasters, internal displacement, and
violence—across the three Northern Triangle
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countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) that together comprise 86 percent of Central Americans arriving at U.S. borders, and as
of 2017, 8 percent of the United States’ 44.5
million immigrants.1
This study also examines the correlation of
these variables across time, considering the
accumulation (sum) of episodes in three years
of variable b, which has a correlating effect on
variable a. For example, when correlating natural disasters in any given year with the number
of internally displaced population, this investigation totaled the number of internal displacements in the three consecutive year period and
then correlated this number with the natural disasters that happened in any given year.
The analysis suggests all variables correlate
positively. However, correlations are stronger
when analyzing internal displacement and violence and violence with out-migration. The data
and analysis of the findings presented in this
report provide a valuable indication of trends
and insights to support effective policymaking
in the region.
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INTRODUCTION
The Central American migration crisis has become a salient issue in U.S. and regional politics.
It is cyclical in nature and has recently acquired
more relevance given the consequences of the
co-existence of the COVID-19 pandemic and
recent climate events on migratory patterns.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported
the compounded impact of those crises contributed to annual economic Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) contractions of 8.6 percent in El
Salvador, 8 percent in Honduras, and 1.5 percent in Guatemala.2
The numbers indicate unprecedented growth.
According to the most recent Global Trends Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the total number of
asylum seekers, refugees, internally displaced
persons, and returnees from Central America
was 107,407 in 2014, while a total of 905,796
were registered by 2019.3 This represents an
increase of approximately 800,000 people in
six years. Comparatively speaking, the Central
American migration crisis comes second after
the Venezuelan migrant and refugee crisis in
the Western Hemisphere regarding the numbers of people forcibly displaced. Half of those
forcibly displaced are adults, and the other half
are accompanied and unaccompanied minors.
Of the adult migrant population, 48 percent are
women.4 With women and minors being the majority, they represent a forcibly displaced group
who are highly vulnerable through the entire
migration process to sexual abuse, gender violence, discrimination, labor, sexual exploitation,
or human trafficking in the countries of transit,
destination, and return.
There are multiple reasons for their displacement. Lack of opportunities, poverty, violence,
crime, food insecurity, and aggravated socioeconomic conditions because of climate change

are all driving migration to the United States. It
is, therefore, no surprise that, along with Venezuelans, citizens from Guatemala, Honduras,
and El Salvador are currently the most prominent group seeking international protection
in the United States.5 A more recent trend between October 2018 and January 2020 was
the so-called “migrant caravans” (caravanas
migrantes), with thousands of Central Americans making their journey to the United States.
These have received intense media coverage,
sparking heated debates in the United States
and abroad.
These caravans are composed mainly of families, children, adolescents, pregnant women,
and older persons, who are most affected by
deteriorating conditions in their native countries, where some may require international
protection. However, it is essential to note that
out-migration to the United States is not necessarily the first option to cope and adapt to
deteriorating conditions for these people. As
this report explores, Central Americans may first
migrate internally before making their journey
out of the region and toward the United States.
In fact, in Honduras and El Salvador, at least
320,000 internally displaced people fled their
homes due to violence and lack of opportunities within their countries, according to UNHCR.
In the case of Guatemala, data is still unknown
as the government has not yet recognized the
issue of internal displacement.
Migration patterns northward will continue to
happen if countries, the international community, and relevant stakeholders in the region
do not address the root causes causing the
displacement. Within the root causes already
mentioned, not only have climate events been
increasing in Central America,6 but the impacts
of climate change tend to be disproportionally
felt by these countries. Indeed, Central America
and Southeast Asia are the two regions globally,
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particularly vulnerable to climate phenomenon7
and the least prepared to respond and quickly
recover from them. In its 2020 report, the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs—Latin America and the Caribbean
(OCHA-ROLAC) indicated that Latin America and
the Caribbean are the second most affected by
climate change. In 2020, the region experienced
COVID-19 with two hurricanes happening in
one week, which has not occurred in the last
50 years. Unlike other countries in South America, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador are
highly vulnerable to climate change due to their
extensive coastlines, economic dependence on
agriculture, and the potential for storm damage.
Other factors adding to this vulnerability include
the lack of preparedness to respond to emergencies and the scarcity of freshwater.8 Considering this, we should expect the migration crisis
to worsen before it gets better in the coming
months.
Is there a connection between the increase in
the frequency and severity of climate events
in Central America and migration? How would
this relationship come about? What role does
internal migration play? And what impact does
the forced internal displacement of these populations affected by climate events have on
community social and security conditions? Can
internal displacement explain security threats
for these countries? And how do these impact
these populations’ move toward the North?
This report seeks to answer these questions by
assessing the correlation between the variables
mentioned above happening two ways, as stated in the following hypothesis:
•
H0: Internal displacement caused by
natural events is not an underlying factor that
incubates violence and social instability, so
forced migration northward stimulated by violence should not be associated with the frequency of natural events
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•
H1: If internal displacement caused by
natural events is an underlying factor that incubates violence and social instability, then forced
migration northward stimulated by violence
should also be associated with the frequency of
natural events.
Rationale: A natural event (Xa) triggers a process
of internal displacement (Xb), which produces
an underlying factor that incubates structural
violence (Xc), creating patterns of human mobility northward (Y).
An attempt is made in this report to study to
what extent natural events are an underlying
factor that incubates violence by looking into
the IDMC data set and its relationship to data on
violence (UNODC dataset) in the Northern Triangle. Furthermore, it assesses migratory patterns
northward between 2008 and 2018. The report
identifies the types of natural events or hazards
by country to evaluate impacts on patterns of
violence that may have emerged and may have
triggered human mobility northward. The report also examines the number of internal displacements caused by natural disasters using
the IDMC dataset between 2008 and 2018 and
correlates it with the different conflict-related
events reported by the UNODC homicide data
set.
The report first briefly reviews the root causes
of human mobility from Central America, putting
the lens on the effects of climate change and
recent natural events in Central America and the
Caribbean. In the second section, the report analyzes the literature on climate vulnerability and
migration and describes how this report contributes to fill research gaps. Whereas the third
section offers an argument of why this matters
from a climate and environmental security risks
perspective, shedding light on the issue of climate events preparedness and recovery and
migration, the following section presents the
correlations between climate events, internal
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displacement, homicide/social instability, and
outward migration. The final section provides
some preliminary recommendations on how
best to address climate drivers of migration and
the critical elements of a whole-of-government
and whole-of-nation approach.

CLIMATE VULNERABILITY AND
MIGRATION: LITERATURE REVIEW
A review of the academic literature on international migration in the Americas reveals
the complexity of studying the factors at the
individual and community level, the historical
and cultural contextual level, and in terms of
the political and economic processes in the
countries of origin and host countries that
influence individual decisions to migrate. This
review becomes more complex considering the
multiplicity of disciplinary approaches used
to understand and explain migration. These
range from predominantly economic to political, social, and anthropological studies, among
others.9
International relations theory has sought to
understand the causality, evolution, dynamics,
and impacts of migration, proposing the main
migration theories. The common denominator in
these studies is the proposition that migration
has responded to dynamics associated with the
globalization of markets. In other words, these
studies argue that, as the capitalist system has
spread from developed countries to less-developed ones, disruptive changes in the forms
of subsistence and economic dynamics have
motivated the displacement of people within
and outside countries. Similarly, this literature
points out there is a significant gap between
the challenges countries and communities face
when receiving these flows of people and the
public policy responses that governments use

to respond to the phenomenon of migration.10
11 12 13

Several authors from Latin American and Caribbean academia have also contributed to the
theory and methodologies of the study of migration. They have analyzed the region’s problems that may influence people’s decisions to
migrate, including corruption and state fragility,
poverty, inequality, violence, insecurity, gang
recruitment, and sexual and gender violence, as
factors that explain human displacement.14 15 16
17 18 19
These contributions have closed the gap
in the literature going beyond the connections
between migration and development, providing
additional explanations of why people in Latin
America migrate.
Poverty, inequality, and the lack of social mobility have been factors studied in the literature as
some of the most important causes of migration. In other words, these authors have studied the experience of poverty and the limited
expectations people have of escaping poverty
as sufficient reason to change countries. This
body of knowledge has also assessed the role
of remittances, finding they have filled the gaps
generated by the state in many cases, thus
aiding the well-being of the population. This is
certainly the case for Honduras and El Salvador.
According to the Pew Research Center, remittances accounted for more than 20 percent of
GDP in 2019, among the highest shares in the
world. In Guatemala, they represent 14 percent
of GDP. This illustrates the growing dependence
of the region’s economies on remittances as a
source of income.
In addition to the factors described above, the
Americas have the highest levels of violence
in the world. Violence, gangs, organized crime,
and failed security policies affect people’s possibilities to fully participate in productive and
political activities with severe effects on their
lives and well-being. Therefore, it is no sur-

9

prise that it has also been an object of study
and considered an expulsion factor for migrant
populations in many of the region’s countries,
but perhaps more so in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. As the political, humanitarian,
and human rights crises have worsened, recent
migration research projects have begun to incorporate political and legal variables. These
include internal conflicts and political crises to
explain forced displacement and intra-regional
migration, such as in the cases of Nicaraguan
and Venezuelan migrants and refugees.
The literature review reveals that many aspects
have not been adequately addressed in the
theoretical analysis of outward migration in the
Americas. On the one hand, there is the issue of
irregular migration. In other words, understanding how migrants in receiving countries who
crossed borders irregularly—through unofficial
crossing points, for example, or exceeding their
time allowed by their visas—remain in a protracted irregular status. Further studies need to
explore the vulnerabilities (beyond migration)
they face in accessing their rights or how best
to account for them so receiving countries can
capitalize from the brain gain upon their arrival. Considering that the vast majority of Latin
American migrants are in an irregular status
makes their particular situation and the question of how to measure irregular migration the
object of further analysis.
Likewise, and considering some policies implemented in the region or due to the COVID-19
pandemic, another issue that will require further
analysis is return migration. The literature review suggests that governments could benefit
from more research on this type of migration,
as it has distinct characteristics and requires
specific public policy responses.
Finally, and more recently, new studies have
also tried to address the role of climate change
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as an explanatory factor of forced displacement, especially from the Northern Corridor of
Central America. Most of the focus has been on
precipitation and droughts as factors that trigger deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and
food insecurity for rural communities in Central
America. At the same time, some studies have
also incorporated violence and conflict in the
analysis. For example, Bermeo and Leblang20
studied the interconnection between climate
and violence linked to migration. They examine the changes in precipitation and increase in
drought in Honduras and how these relate to
violence and migration. The authors analyzed
these patterns by looking at precipitation and
violence data in Honduras and family apprehension from Honduras at the border. Their
findings suggest that as cities in Honduras become more resilient to rainfall and find ways to
resist its climate effects and combat violence,
migration will likely decrease in the long run.
For its part, the World Food Program (WFP), the
International Organization for Migration (IOM),
the Organization of American States (OAS), and
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)21
assessed the relationship between food insecurity because of climate events and migration
from the Northern Triangle. Their study also
used the lack of precipitation to test for the correlation between food insecurity and migration
to the United States from the Northern Triangle
countries. While it can help to understand human mobility patterns for the Central American
region, this study focused on the Dry Corridor,
which has been affected by El Niño, and the impact this natural phenomenon has had on the
food supply for families in this area. According
to the study, the relationship between climate
change and food supply can help explain increases in out-migration toward the North.
Other authors have considered different factors
when studying the impact of natural disasters
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on migration. An IOM report22 focuses on community resilience in the face of climate events.
Their study argues that the state of vulnerability
in which the individuals were in, once the disaster hit them, influences how much this will
affect them. They argue that poverty levels,
violence, food insecurity, access to land, and
support from the state contribute to the individual’s final decision to migrate. Moreover, the
IOM study proposes that any policy response to
address migration must attempt to mitigate the
consequences (disaster risks) of climate events
as they influence the mobility of individuals. Regarding violence and conflict in the region, the
study also found a prevalence of data regarding violence and conflict as a driver of migration and less on environmental explanations of
migration. Moreover, they argue there is a need
for more studies that correlate natural disasters
and conflict as drivers of migration in Central
America.

environmental factors as having a role in the
equation.

However, there have been studies on how violence and crime correlate with migration. Using
data from the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the Latin American
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Roth et al. conducted a clustered impact evaluation to measure CARSI’s prevention programs.23 They found
evidence that victims of crime were more likely
to express their desire to migrate (2020). Their
findings complement the IOM study cited above
by explaining that vulnerable communities exposed to violence or any economic or gender
vulnerability are already more prone to suffering greater consequences from migrating.

Added to this are persistent economic and
structural causes, such as a weak rule of law,
corruption and impunity, citizen distrust, high
poverty rates, low levels of economic development, exclusion and inequality, lack of opportunities—especially for women, young people,
and other vulnerable groups,25 and food insecurity. As a result of the social and economic
impacts of climate events, these have also entered the equation as another indicator to explain the increase in irregular migration from
Central America to the United States.

This report builds on this literature on migration, paying particular attention to the incidence
of natural disasters and conflict on migration
and internal displacement. Several scholars
have aimed to explain the correlation between
conflict/violence in the Northern Triangle with
migration. Yet, few studies have considered

CLIMATE-RELATED DRIVERS
OF MIGRATION FROM CENTRAL
AMERICA: WHY IT MATTERS
The reasons for Central American migration
to the United States are multiple and vary
from country to country. However, some are
common to the three countries. First, Central
America continues to be among the areas
without war with the highest homicide rates
worldwide, with increasing levels of violence
and citizen insecurity, including forced recruitment in gangs, drug trafficking, and organized
crime activities, as well as extortion. The region
also experiences widespread sexual and gender-based violence and community violence,
mainly affecting women and children.24

Each country faces different climate-related
challenges, although some are shared from
country to country. There is a high susceptibility
to hurricanes and severe storms in Guatemala,
but the country is also subject to volcanic activity and earthquakes. Similarly, droughts have
affected the country since early 2010 and, more
pronouncedly, starting in 2014-2015. Current
environmental issues also include deforestation
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in the Peten rain forest, soil erosion, and water
pollution. Its Caribbean coast is susceptible to
hurricanes and severe storms, and coastlines
on the Pacific and Atlantic oceans and territories surrounding rivers are affected by flooding.26
For its part, El Salvador has seen a consistent
increase in extreme events, mainly storms,
floods, and droughts. The country is also experiencing severe deforestation and land degradation, making it even more vulnerable to climate variability and change. The Dry Corridor
covers a big part of El Salvador, and recurrent
droughts and heavy precipitation events often
lead to flooding and landslides. Coastal areas,
home to more than 30 percent of the population, are highly vulnerable to the combination
of sea-level rise and El Niño-related climate
events.27 Finally, while the Dry Corridor also
covers parts of Honduras, the country faces
similar risks to its neighboring countries with
severe vulnerability to climate events such as
hurricanes, tropical storms, floods, droughts,
and landslides affecting agricultural production
and critical infrastructure.28
These adverse climate-related conditions have
had an impact on these countries’ economies.
For example, Hurricanes Eta and Iota in 2020
resulted in $1.9 billion29 and $780 in damages
and economic losses for Honduras and Guatemala,30 respectively. The human losses were
also devastating. Apart from the financial and
human losses, people, families, and communities’ day-to-day material conditions for subsistence are also affected by poorly-managed
climate events. As this happens, they also tend
to force intrastate migration, cause more significant economic hardship in the cities where
people migrate, and eventually increase social
tensions or violence. As people face poverty and social conflict/violence, out-migration
becomes the only choice to ensure access to
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fundamental rights. The 2017 study mentioned
above by WFP, IOM, OAS, and IDB confirmed that
the droughts in the Dry Corridor of Guatemala
caused food insecurity due to reductions in agricultural production.
Furthermore, it found a significant correlation
between precipitation deficits since 2014 due
to El Niño and the increase in irregular migration to the United States for subsequent years.
The patterns were similar during the COVID-19
pandemic with hurricanes Eta and Iota. A survey conducted by the WFP in early 2021 in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador found that
around 15 percent of the people surveyed were
reportedly already making concrete plans to migrate, up from 8 percent in 2018.31
Climate events do not have to generate these
levels of human and economic losses, which
may eventually cause internal displacement
and out-migration. Investing in disaster preparedness on damage assessment, epidemiology, health services, infrastructure protection,
water and sanitation, administration, logistics,
and communication will reduce damages and
losses. This is even more important as the frequency and intensity of climate events increases. Indeed, as climate-related events continue
evolving in terms of frequency and severity,
additional strains will be put on the Guatemalan, Honduran, and El Salvadoran governments.
These countries will continue to face complex
challenges in their capacity to address ongoing
development barriers, including extreme poverty and inequality, low levels of education, acute
environmental degradation, and rampant crime
and violence, while also responding to climate
events and recovering after they occur. In this
regard, leaders must prioritize new strategies
to help these countries prepare for and recover
from severe climate events, therefore mitigating
the root causes of migration. Indeed, the Central American region needs to move away from
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reactive responses to climate events and turn
to more proactive, comprehensive, and intersectional approaches to prevent and mitigate
the adverse effects of climate events. At the
same time, the international community must
focus on helping these countries prepare for
climate events, and ultimately, reverse deteriorating trends in political, social, security, and
economic conditions that force people to leave.

NATURAL DISASTERS, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, HOMICIDE, AND MIGRATION: ASSESSING CORRELATIONS
Building on the findings and conclusions of disaster and conflict scholarship, together with
natural disaster and conflict-event data covering 2008-2018, this report analyzes the linkages between natural disasters, violence, and
forced displacement by using a multivariate
model to test the results statistically.
This report argues that, in general, climate
events that occur when communities have not
built resilience have the potential of depleting
people’s material and socioeconomic well-being. This can contribute to conflict and aggravate community violence because it creates
competition for scarce resources, exacerbates
inequality with the unequal distribution of aid,
changes power relationships among individuals,
groups, and the organizations that serve them,
and can create power vacuums and opportunities for non-state (criminal) actors to usurp
power.
The quantitative research analysis in this study
endeavors to determine the strength of the climate event-conflict-mobility hypothesis. The
analysis seeks to validate the traditional determinants of violence and indicates the importance of incorporating system shocks, such as

natural events, into studies and explanations of
human mobility. For example, floods in El Salvador forced conflict IDPs to move due to the
flooding, which increased hardship on communities hosting them. In Honduras, rural areas
hard-hit by flooding (2008-2018) were already
having difficulties growing sufficient food for
their communities.32 The arrival of newcomers
displaced by the fighting in other parts of the
country increased the strain on these communities.
Natural events, directly and indirectly, can create the conditions for instability and conflict by
exacerbating social grievances and resource
scarcities and accelerating social systems
changes. Despite a plethora of studies in the
conflict realm, negligible attention has been
devoted to the study of violence in the aftermath of internal forced displacement caused by
natural events and how it can create northward
mobility. This report takes a preliminary step in
that direction, analyzing the wide range of environmental, social, spatial, and political effects
of natural disasters in conflict-ridden and conflict-free areas of the Northern Triangle.
As explained earlier, this study considers internal displacement and migration from Central
America as dependent variables when running
the correlations. These variables are affected
by two other independent variables at different
levels: natural events or hazards and conflict/
violence. For this study, internal displacement
is defined under the 1998 Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement.33 Internally displaced
persons (IDPs) are “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or
to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or to avoid the
effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have
not crossed an internationally recognized State
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border.”34
Regarding the other dependent variable, namely
migration, this report uses the definition proposed by the IOM, which understands it as “the
movement of persons away from their place of
usual residence, either across an international
border or within a State.” For Central American
migration, there are variations of the term that
can help explain it, including concepts such as
climate migration, displacement, international
migration, irregular migration, labor migration,
migrant, and safe, orderly, and regular migration, among others.
The report argues that both internal displacement and migration are affected by natural
events and conflict/violence. In this sense, the
paper considers natural events as particular
natural events that have large-scale effects
on the environment and people. Therefore, this
analysis addresses the impact of floods, storms,
earthquakes, extreme temperatures, dry mass
movements, volcanic eruptions, and wet mass
movements.
For its part, this study adopts the UNDP approach in terms of the classic definition of conflict as “a process of contentious interaction
between social actors and institutions which
mobilize with different levels of organization and
act collectively to improve conditions, defend
existing situations, or advance new alternative
social projects.”35 However, the study uses the
proxy of violence to analyze the conflict criteria.
The data for this report comes from three different sources. The information for internal
displacement came from the IDMC’s database.
At the same time, this report used the UNODC
homicide count per country and per year data
for the conflict and violence variables and U.N.
data from the U.N. Population Division to explain the number of displaced populations from
each country to their country of destination to
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account for emigration. The period selected
for this study is 2008-2018, and the countries
selected are those known as the Northern Triangle: Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.
When accounting for external migration, the
countries considered are those in the Northern
Triangle, Mexico, and the United States.
The IDMC collects its data yearly by relying on
government agencies, U.N. organizations, the
International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies (IFRC), local authorities, and
humanitarian clusters to offer displacement figures. When the data provided by governments
is incomplete or insufficient, IDMC considers
data from international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society, nonstate armed groups,36 local media, and affected
populations, among other sources.
The data from the UNODC comes from statistics that U.N. Member States submit to it on
drugs, crime, and criminal justice. The UNODC
also collects data through national surveys implemented alongside national governments and
scientific literature. Similarly, the U.N. Population Division data comes from official statistics
on the foreign-born or foreign population by
country of origin. One caveat is that the data
from the U.N. Population Division only provides
estimates for 2010 and 2015.
The methodology used for this study consisted of using correlations to measure the association between natural disasters and internal
displacement in that same year and two consecutive years. The correlation between internal displacement and the number of homicides
per country and year is evaluated, considering
the total number of homicides every year with
two consecutive years added. Finally, the same
method of accounting for three successive
years was used to assess the correlation between violence and migration northward.
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As explained above, the disasters included in
the variable for the number of natural disasters per year from IDMC include floods, storms,
earthquakes, extreme temperatures, dry mass
movements, volcanic eruptions, and wet mass
movements. The variable that looks at internal
displacement from natural disasters includes
the number of new displacements due to each
natural disaster type. For violence/conflict and
instability, we used homicide data from the UNODC, given it is the most complete dataset we
found regarding violence in these three countries. Moreover, given that displaced populations tend to be excluded and marginalized, we
considered homicide a good indicator of violence. People tend to be more affected by this
form of violence. This variable accounts for the
number of homicides in each country per year.
Lastly, the variable for northward migration includes the number of migrants from each country that migrates to Mexico, the United States,
and Canada per year.
For our analysis, we used the ggcorr package
within R to create heat maps representing the
correlation between the different variables using the Pearson correlation coefficient as our
measure.37
The formula for the Pearson correlation coefficient is:
r=(xi–x)(yi–y)xi–x2(yi–y)2
Where:
r=correlation coefficient
xi=values of the x variable
x=mean of the values of the x variable
yi=values of the y variable
y=mean of the values of the y variable

In this case, there are four main variables used
interchangeably as the x and y variables. These
are the variables for the sum of the natural disasters in the three countries of study, the variable for the total sum of internal displacement
per country in three-year groups, the variable
for total homicides in the region in three-year
groups, and the variable for the total sum of migration toward the northern countries.
These were then crossed following the transitivity principle in which, if A influences B, and B
influences C, then C must also be influenced by
A. In this case, the hypothesis is that if natural
disasters correlate with internal displacement
in the Northern Triangle countries, they could
increase the number of homicides (used as a
proxy for violence) in the region. The increase
in violence could be correlated with migration
toward northern countries (Mexico, the United
States, and Canada). Two important caveats to
keep in mind is that correlation does not imply
causation. Although there might be a correlation between the variables, one cannot make
any claims of causality between the different
variables solely based on the existence of this
correlation. Secondly, we discovered a limitation of available data in this case, which could
provide an important opportunity to identify
new gaps in the prior literature and present the
need for further development in this particular
area of study. These two caveats are explored
further in the following sections.

RESULTS
The results corroborate previous studies relating to the relationship between migration,
internal displacement, conflict, and natural
disasters. After running the four different correlations that this report proposes, the findings
suggest a weak but positive correlation between natural disasters and internal displacement. The Pearson correlation coefficient is
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0.21. When testing for the significance level of
this correlation coefficient at a 90 percent confidence level, the p-value obtained was 0.601.
Given that this value is greater than 0.10, the
null hypothesis that the true correlation is equal
to zero cannot be rejected. In other words, the
findings indicate that the existence of floods,
hurricanes, or earthquakes, among other natural events, may not be the only determinant of
internal displacement in these three countries.
Still, it is definitively influencing people’s decision to move. As more variables are included in
the correlations and more factors are considered, the correlations get more potent, as Figure 1 shows.
When assessing the second correlation between
internal displacement due to natural disasters
and homicide, the correlation coefficient is 0.7.
This shows that the relationship between internal displacement caused by natural disasters
and homicide is strong. This correlation coefficient was found by comparing the three-year
sum of the internally displaced people due to
natural disasters in each country with the total
homicides in the region. When we tested for the
significance of the Pearson correlation coefficient, the p-value obtained is 0.063, which is
lower than the alpha level of 0.10 (confidence
interval of 90 percent), so we can reject the null
hypothesis. In other words, there is evidence
that internal displacement caused by natural disasters in these three countries may exacerbate violence measured by the number of
homicides occurring in communities that have
received IDPs due to natural disasters. Since
this correlation between IDPs due to natural
events and homicides is strong, this study recommends further studies that account for other
factors and use alternative methodologies such
as linear regressions.
Moreover, there is a correlation between homicide and migration. The correlation coefficient,
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in this case, is 0.8. When testing for the significance of this coefficient, the p-value was 0.031.
At a 90 percent confidence level, this p-value is
significant because it is less than 0.10, meaning the null hypothesis that the correlation is
different from zero can be rejected. Given these
results, there is an essential and strong correlation between homicide and migration toward
the North. What Figure 1 suggests, then, is that
this study shows strong results when it comes
to the correlation between homicide and migration toward the northern countries. As it still exists to some degree, a correlation between displacement and natural disasters (r=0.220), did
not yield a significant result at the 90 percent
confidence level. Therefore, this study cannot
rule out the possibility there might not be a correlation at all. In other words, all variables are
positively correlated. However, as we crossed
the different variables, the levels of correlation
became stronger.
Furthermore, the significance tests applied to
measure the confidence levels rejected the null
hypothesis of this research. In this sense, this
study is an invitation to create more accessible data on human mobility associated with
environmental factors that are sufficient and
of quality. Thus, the region could make visible
and provide a better understanding and attention to migration triggers, allowing and thereby
substantiating policies, actions, and decisions
at the regional and national level.
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FIGURE 1: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN NATURAL DISASTERS, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT,
HOMICIDE, AND MIGRATION TOWARD THE
NORTH (MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND
CANADA) SHOWING THE LEVELS OF SIGNIFICANCE FOR EACH CORRELATION

+0.50 to 0.99. Very strong evidence of variables correlating
-0.50 to -0.99. Very strong evidence of variables inversely correlated
Exactly +1. Complete evidence found of variables correlating
Exactly -1. Complete evidence found of variables inversely correlating
Source: Prepared by the authors for this study

Exactly 0. No evidence found that the variables correlate
0 to 0.25 Very weak evidence that the variables correlate
0 to -0.25 Very weak evidence that the variables inversely correlate

Putting these results into perspective and contextualizing them, as Figure 2 shows, the correlations intensify as more variables are factored into the model. This report argues that
this is the case since emigration is a process
that occurs progressively after an initial shock
(in this case, natural disasters). The study accounts for countries that have suffered years
of deterioration and have not improved their
resilience mechanisms to defend themselves
against these shocks. Thus, there are increases in internally displaced populations and migrants who look for opportunities in Northern
countries.

0.25 to 0.49. weak evidence that the variables correlate
-0.25 to -0.49. weak evidence that the variables inversely correlate
Exactly 0.5, evidence found of variables
correlating
Exactly -0.5, evidence found of variables
inversely correlating
+0.1 to 0.49. Strong evidence found of variables correlating
-0.1 to -0.49. Strong evidence found of variables inversely correlating
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FIGURE 2: INTENSITY OF CORRELATION BETWEEN NATURAL DISASTERS AND MIGRATION TOWARD THE NORTH

Source: Prepared by the authors for this study

After assessing the results, the report suggests
different reasons why the correlations result as
they do. First, looking at the results from a vulnerability perspective, when a natural disaster
strikes a country, the level of vulnerability individuals face is of a certain magnitude. However, as displacement begins to occur because
of these disasters, their vulnerability levels increase, reflecting the Pearson correlation coefficient increase.
FIGURE 3. COUNTRY OF HAZARD TYPE

Source: Prepared by the authors for this study

Data related to violence, conflict, and economic factors prevail as primary triggers of human
mobility in the region. Other more easily identifiable factors often hide the environmental trigger, either by the absence of studies and the
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production of specific data, practical and methodological difficulties to generate this type of
data, or the limited perception of the environmental factor as a mobility inducer. It is necessary to reinforce the relationship between
multiple vectors of mobility in the region and,
especially, how environmental factors are the
trigger and are related to economic vulnerability, insecurity, conflict, and violence.
Generating evidence and data about the phenomenon requires two aspects: (i) developing,
testing, and validating specific methodologies,
and (ii) reinforcing, improving, and coordinating
methodologies and existing data sources. The
absence of characterization and precise definition of the phenomenon and its categories and
a defined and coherent methodology with the
region’s specificities are the main barriers.
It is necessary to invest in data production systems with integrated indicators on the environment and human mobility. This can generate a
set of regional indicators of human mobility induced by climate change and disasters, which
requires an integrated analysis and coordination between different databases and data
sources and the development of specific methodologies.
This study, therefore, indicates the need to expand the availability of specific data, identify
and fill gaps in data on the phenomenon, produce new data where it does not exist, and develop methodologies, standards, and common
protocols for harvesting, analysis, and data
collection. In addition, creating collaborative
platforms for the dissemination and exchange
of data to improve its accessibility and applicability is highly recommended.
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:
HOW TO SUPPORT THE
WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT
AND WHOLE-OF-NATION APPROACHES TO RESPOND TO
CLIMATE-RELATED DRIVERS
OF MIGRATION
Promoting economic prosperity, improving security, and strengthening governance in the
Northern Triangle must be at the core of U.S.
engagement in the region, primarily to mitigate
the root causes of migration. This should also
be a priority for the region. Some vital preliminary recommendations to address the climate
drivers of migration are offered. These ultimately require a combination of political work, financial and technical assistance, and inclusive engagement with other stakeholders at the local
level. Responses should also include providing
international protection and regularization options for these populations in transit and destination countries. Recommendations include the
following:
Political Engagement
a.

Provide incentives for leaders to show
progress toward implementing international
commitments and frameworks to address
climate change, adaptability, and resilience
of local communities. These could be in the
form of additional or new forms of financial
or technical cooperation.

b. Promote awareness among political and military institutions in the regional leadership
(political, military) on the need to provide an
integrated response to climate events. This
would include designing and implementing strategic plans and preparing logistical,
infrastructure systems, and personnel to
respond to climate events that may jeopardize their already fragile economies, re-

sources, and adaptive capacities.38 Considering that half of the irregular migrants from
Central America are women, particular attention should be paid to the unique needs
of women and girls in the development of
these responses, as recommended by U.N.
Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security.
c.

Develop concrete military cooperation initiatives for disaster preparedness and response, focusing on protecting the most
affected resources and services during a
climate event: water, shelter, health services, and food. There should be a specific
focus on the most vulnerable populations,
including women, who ultimately are forced
to migrate to the North and face additional
vulnerabilities.

d. Bring the political discussion on the environmental explanations for Central American migration to the highest level, including
using the Summit of the Americas process
(currently led by the United States) as a forum to promote a regional conversation on
the issue. It would be strategic to encourage a discussion on leveraging public, private, and international financing to respond
to climate events in Central America. This
way, the costs of the response and stabilization after natural events are not primarily
absorbed by the United States via financial
and technical cooperation.
International Financial and Technical Assistance
a.

Assist institutions in the region with generating data or information for analysis that
would include the experiences and situations of women and men and how climate
events impact them. For example, the basis
for developing agricultural policy and targeting cooperation programs to prepare for
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climate-related events should be data-driven and disaggregated by gender and age.
This would allow assessing who produces
what—and how—to provide information
capable of identifying differences and inequalities to address through technical and
financial interventions.

tral America) to close the gaps in information and knowledge in all the dimensions
of climate change impacts at the region’s
economic, social, and environmental levels.
Concrete outcomes may include the generation of data and the sharing of methodologies and tools to monitor, share, and track
information and events at the local, national, and regional levels, as well as devising
locally relevant whole-of-government efforts to inform their choices about adapting to and reducing vulnerability to climate
change.

b. Provide safety nets, skills training, drought
insurance schemes, and small business
grants to farmers—especially women
farmers, including assistance with climate-sensitive agriculture and innovative,
climate-related solutions to seeds and production to help people in rural agricultural
areas prepare for natural events. Ultimately,
these types of interventions improve people’s material conditions in general, and
more so, in case of a climate event, helping
anchor potential migrants to their communities of origin. A good example of effective U.S. aid is the USAID-financed program
called Climate, Nature, and Communities of
Guatemala, which showed promising results
in helping rural Guatemalans respond to climate change through crop diversification,
water conservation, and reforestation.

b. Engage the private sector as a pivotal
contributor to fostering climate event preparedness and inclusion opportunities for
local communities. In addition, the private
sector40 could be an ally in identifying specific climate-related disruptions of critical
systems of life support that may lead to
security-relevant outcomes such as political instability, violent conflict, humanitarian
disasters, and internal displacement and
out-migration. International financial institutions such as the WB and IDB should also
be engaged.

c.

c.

Provide cooperation to support facilitated
migration to “intermediary cities,”39 and for
infrastructure preparation in these cities to
help individuals and communities secure
better livelihoods while lifting pressures in
destination areas within the country. Comprehensive programs to generate opportunities for internally displaced people must
also be considered, including the provision
of unconditional cash transfers in urban areas with high numbers of IDPs.

Effective inclusive engagement with local actors
a.
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Engage with academia and the intelligence
community (in the United States and Cen-

Encourage local solutions to economic, social, and environmental sustainability and
provide seed funding for the launch and implementation of programs. Providing support to organizations at the regional level,
such as the Tropical Agricultural Research
and Teaching Center, or through a multilateral entity such as the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture, would
be an optimal way to encourage local solutions. These organizations work through
their programs to generate innovative ideas
and actions that improve the livelihoods of
local populations while providing goods and
services. Research and data collection are
also part of their mandates and would sup-
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port the development of evidence-based
policy responses to climate change.
d. Engage migrant and diaspora networks in
the United States to support local development, climate events preparedness, disaster recovery, and climate change adaptation
in Central American countries.
International Protection and Regularization
a.

For countries in the region, continue evaluating and taking steps to facilitate further
regularization processes for migrants and
forcibly displaced people who consider
their migration’s root causes to prevent irregularity and take advantage of their talents and contributions.

section between natural disasters, migration
toward the northern countries, and conflict and
violence. One limitation was the type of data
available on this topic. Moreover, another recommendation is for more rigorous analysis to
consider other factors such as income levels,
gender, type of natural disaster, level of crime,
and different types of violence and conflict.
Furthermore, to better assess the impact or
causal relationship between these variables,
studies such as randomized controlled trials
exploring the various effects over time would
help to better evaluate the relationship among
these variables.

b. Consider resettlement frameworks or humanitarian visa programs for climate-related migrants and forcibly displaced populations. Good practice in this regard is the
process that began in 2014, developed by
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, to
contribute to the provision of international
protection to citizens from Syria.
c.

Along with regularization options, invest in
access to identification documents by migrants and refugees as both actions can
decrease human trafficking and migrant
smuggling at the border.

d. Continue global discussions to consider a
particular category of protection of environmental migrants and refugees to include
and protect people who, because of depleted livelihoods and losses due to climate
events not adequately managed, have no
choice but to flee.
In conclusion, this study serves as a starting
point for further analysis regarding the interrelationships between climate change and migration. It shows promise in studying the inter-
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